This paper considers the application of a novel optimization method, namely Particle Swarm Optimization, to compute Nash equilibria. The problem of computing equilibria is formed as one of detecting the global minimizers of a real-valued, nonnegative, function. To detect more than one global minimizers of the function at a single run of the algorithm and address effectively the problem of local minima, the recently proposed Deflection technique is employed. The performance of the proposed algorithm is compared to that of algorithms implemented in the popular game theory software suite, GAMBIT. Conclusions are derived.
Introduction
A central solution concept in game theory is that of Nash eq~ilibrium.~ Several approaches have been proposed for the computation of Nash equilibria in finite strategic games but computing such solutions remains a challenging task. Furthermore, as pointed out in Ref. 3, computing a single Nash equilibrium is inadequate for many applications. The problem of detecting a Nash equilibrium can be formulated as a global minimization problem. This approach enables us to consider an efficient and effective optimization method, named Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO), to address this problem. Incorporating the recently proposed Deflection technique for alleviating local minima and finding more than one global minimizers of a function, several Nash equilibria can be located in a single run of the algorithm. The performance of the proposed algorithm is compared to that of algorithms implemented in the popular game theory software suite GAM-BIT." aThe GAMBIT suite is freely available from: http: //ww.hss. caltech. edu/gambit/. Sciences and Engineering (ICCMSE 2003) September 12-16, 2003, Kastoria, Greece, pp.484-489 World Scientific Publishing Co., River Edge, NJ, U.S. A., 2003 [ISBN: 981-238-595-9] The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the formulation of the problem. In Sections 3 and 4 the PSO and the Deflection techniques are briefly exposed. Experimental results are reported in Section 5 and conclusions are drawn in Section 6. Let Pi be the set of real valued functions on Si. The notation p i j = p i ( s i j ) , is used for the elements pi E Pi. Let also P = x~~N P~ and m = CiENmi. Then P is isomorphic to Rm. We denote elements in P by P = ( P I , P~, . . . , P~) , where pi = (~i 1 1~i 2 1 * * . 1~i m j ) E Pi. If P E P , and pi E Pi, we use the notation @ : , p i ) for the element q E P that satisfies qi = pi and qi = p j for j # i. Now let Ai be the set of probability measures on Si. We define A = x~~N A~, so A C R". Thus, the elements pi E Ai are real valued functions on Si, pi : Si 4 R and it holds that C s i j E S j p i ( s i j ) = 1, and p i ( s i j ) 3
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We use the abusive notation sij to denote the strategy pi E Ai with p i j = 1. Hence, the notation ( s i j , p -i ) represents the strategy where player i adopts the pure strategy s i j , and all the other players adopt their components of p .
The payoff function u is extended to have domain Rm by the rule 0 , V S i j E si. 
Nash Equilibrium as a Global Minimizer
To formulate the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium to that of detecting the global minimum of a real valued function, three functions, z, z and g : P -+ Rm, are required. For any p E P , i E N and sij E Si, define:
The real valued function v : P -+ R, is defined as: 
Particle Swarm Optimization
PSO belongs to the broad class of stochastic optimization algorithms. PSO is a population-based algorithm that exploits a population of individuals, to probe promising regions of the search space. In this context, the population is called swarm and the individuals are called particles. Each particle is assigned to a neighborhood and moves with an adaptable velocity within the search space, retaining in its memory the best position it ever encountered. Moreover, the best position ever attained by all individuals of a neighborhood is communicated to the particles that comprise the neighb~rhood.~ Assume a D-dimensional search space, S c RD, and a swarm consisting of N particles. The i-th particle is in effect a D-dimensional vector X i = (~1 , ~2 , .
. . , z~D )~. The velocity of this particle is also a D-dimensional vector, K = (vil, ui2, . . . , v~D )~. The best previous position encountered by the i-th particle is a point in S , denoted as Pi = (pil,pia,. . . pi^)^.
Assume g to be the index of the particle that attained the best previous position among all the individuals of the swarm, and t to be the iteration counter. Then, according to the latest version of PSO, which incorporates a parameter called constriction factor, the swarm is manipulated using the following equations: 
Detecting Several Minimizers Through Deflection
To detect several global minimizers in a single run, the Deflection technique is applied. Let f : S -+ R, S c Rn, be the original objective function under consideration. Let also xz, i = 1 , . . . , m, be m minimizers of f . Then, the Deflection technique is defined as:
where Xi, i = 1, . . . , m, are relaxation parameters. The functions, 
Experimental Results
The proposed algorithm has been applied on noncooperative strategic games characterized by more than one Nash equilibrium. A comparison of the algorithm's performance against the Lyapunov function algorithm implemented in GAMBIT produced promising results. The particular algorithm was selected since it is the suggested algorithm for detecting all the equilibria of an n-person game.4 Indicative test problems are defined below:
Test problem 1 [BACH OR STRAVINSKY']: Two-player game, with two pure strategies available to each player and 3 equilibria. The payoff matrix for this game is illustrated in Table 1 .
Test problem 2 [HAWK-DOVE']: Two-player game, with two pure strategies available to each player and 3 equilibria. The payoff matrix for this game is also illustrated in Table 1 .
Test problem 3 [STAG HUNT GAME4]: Two-player game, with three pure strategies available to each player and 6 equilibria. The payoff matrix is illustrated in Table 2 .
Test problem 4: Random strategic game with two players and three pure strategies available to each player, with payoffs randomly distributed in the interval [0,1] and 3 equilibria. The payoff matrix is illustrated in Table 3 .
Test problem 5 : Normal form three player game with two pure strategies available to each player and 9 e q~i l i b r i a .~ The payoffs of this game are given in Table 4 . The configuration of the PSO parameters has been fixed for all test problems, with the exception of swarm size, which was problem dependent.
